

*Original Article*

# Adaptive Reuse of Legacy Military Structures into SCIF-Compliant Facilities: Engineering Constraints and Solutions

**Yevhen Kidyaykin**

CEO at EKid.

Received: 11-03-2023

Revised: 11-20-2023

Accepted: 11-27-2023

Published: 12-03-2023

## ABSTRACT

*The adaptive reuse of legacy military structures into Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) presents a convergence of structural engineering, electromagnetic shielding, and security compliance challenges. This paper develops an engineering framework for assessing the feasibility of such conversions under Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 705, Intelligence Community Standard (ICS) 705-1, and the IC Technical Specification for ICD/ICS 705. Drawing on published shielding theory, established structural assessment methodology, and current Department of Defense facility criteria, the paper identifies four governing constraint domains: the inherent RF attenuation of legacy building fabric, penetration management, structural capacity for shielded enclosure loads, and hazardous-material remediation. Core drilling methodologies for penetration routing, waveguide-below-cutoff treatment, and penetration sealing are examined against the applicable technical criteria. A parametric lifecycle cost model illustrates the conditions under which adaptive reuse is economically favourable relative to new construction, together with a sensitivity analysis across the governing parameters. All numerical values presented in this paper are modelled illustrative parameters derived from published sources and standard engineering assumptions; they are not measurements from a documented project set. The framework is intended to support early-stage feasibility screening by facility planners, and empirical validation across a documented project set is identified as necessary future work.*

## KEYWORDS

*SCIF, Adaptive Reuse, ISD 705, RF Shielding, Tempest, Core Drilling, Penetration Sealing, Structural Retrofit, Legacy Military Facilities, Electromagnetic Attenuation.*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The United States Department of Defense (DoD) maintains an extensive inventory of legacy military structures, many constructed between 1940 and 1985 under building standards that predate contemporary security and electromagnetic emission requirements. As the demand for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) continues to grow – driven by expanding intelligence operations, cyber warfare commands, and multi-domain operations – the conversion of existing military buildings into SCIF-compliant environments represents a strategically significant alternative to new construction.

SCIF construction and accreditation are governed by Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 705, Intelligence Community Standard (ICS) 705-1, and ICS 705-02, with construction and testing detail set out separately in the IC Technical Specification for ICD/ICS 705. These instruments establish requirements for physical security, radio-frequency (RF) shielding, acoustic attenuation, and access control. Legacy military structures – characterized by reinforced concrete, load-bearing masonry, and steel-frame construction – present both opportunities and impediments for achieving these standards through adaptive reuse.

The engineering challenge is multifaceted. Legacy structures typically exhibit degraded structural capacity due to age-related deterioration, contain hazardous materials such as asbestos insulation and lead-based paint, and feature penetration pathways ductwork, conduit runs, plumbing stacks that were designed without consideration for electromagnetic containment. Simultaneously, these structures often possess desirable characteristics for SCIF conversion: substantial concrete and masonry mass that provides inherent RF attenuation, robust structural frames capable of supporting shielded enclosure loads, and existing security infrastructure including perimeter fencing and controlled entry points.

This paper addresses the engineering constraints and candidate solutions associated with converting legacy military structures into SCIF-compliant facilities. The analysis is developed from published engineering literature, current DoD and IC facility criteria, and standard structural and electromagnetic modelling assumptions, and is illustrated throughout by a representative modelled scenario set. Specific focus is given to three primary technical domains: (1) core drilling and penetration management, (2) penetration sealing and waveguide implementation, and (3) structural retrofitting to accommodate shielded enclosure systems. No claim is made that the illustrative values reported here derive from an audited portfolio of completed projects.

## 2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1. SCIF Requirements under ICD 705

ICD 705 establishes the baseline physical and technical security standards for SCIFs within the Intelligence Community. ICS 705-1 sets out the corresponding physical and technical security standards, while ICS 705-02 governs accreditation and reciprocal use [1]. The construction methods, material specifications, and testing protocols themselves are contained in the IC Technical Specification

for ICD/ICS 705, which UFC 4-010-05 identifies as the source of minimum and enhanced construction requirements for SCIF perimeters and perimeter penetrations [2]. Acoustic performance is classified by Sound Group, with Sound Group 3 corresponding to STC 45 or better and Sound Group 4 to STC 50 or better.

The TEMPEST program, which addresses the containment of compromising emanations from information processing equipment, imposes additional electromagnetic shielding requirements that are often the most technically challenging aspect of SCIF construction. It is important to note that no single universal RF attenuation figure applies across all SCIFs. UFC 4-010-05 provides that RF shielding and other TEMPEST mitigation shall be provided as determined by the Certified TEMPEST Technical Authority (CTTA) for the facility in question, and the governing guidance, including CNSSAM TEMPEST/1-13, is not published as an open threshold set [3]. This paper therefore expresses shielding performance as attenuation achieved and as margin against a facility-specific criterion, rather than against an asserted ICD 705 minimum.

## 2.2. Legacy Military Construction Characteristics

Military construction from the 1940s through the 1980s was predominantly governed by MIL-HDBK series standards and Army Corps of Engineers Technical Manuals. These structures fall into several typological categories relevant to SCIF conversion: Type I reinforced concrete bunkers and command centers, Type II steel-frame administrative buildings with masonry infill, Type III pre-engineered metal buildings, and Type IV wood-frame temporary structures. Types I and II present the most favorable candidates for adaptive reuse due to their inherent mass, structural redundancy, and existing security features [15].

Previous studies have documented the structural degradation patterns common to military structures of this era, including carbonation-induced reinforcement corrosion in concrete elements, alkali-silica reaction (ASR) in concrete mixed with reactive aggregates prevalent in certain geographic regions, and fatigue-related cracking in steel connections subjected to thermal cycling in unconditioned spaces [4], [10]. These degradation mechanisms directly impact the feasibility and cost of SCIF conversion by reducing available structural capacity for shielding system loads.

## 3. METHODOLOGY

This paper is analytical rather than empirical. A representative scenario set of fourteen modelled retrofit cases was constructed to span the range of legacy building types encountered in practice, with structure ages from 35 to 78 years. Each modelled case is defined by a structural typology, a floor area, a shielding system type, and a cost basis; the parameter values are drawn from published construction cost data, manufacturer performance specifications, and standard engineering assumptions, and are stated in full in Table I. These cases are illustrative constructs used to exercise the framework. They are not measurements from completed projects, and no project records, certification results, or agency data underlie them.

Shielding effectiveness in the modelled cases is expressed over 200 MHz to 18 GHz, consistent with the principal frequency range of IEEE Std 299-2006, which covers 9 kHz to 18 GHz and extends beyond that range only under the additional conditions specified in the standard. Values above 18 GHz are not reported, since the measurement methodology assumed here does not extend to them. Acoustic performance is expressed using the rating framework of ASTM E90 (laboratory) and ASTM E336 (field). Structural capacity is evaluated following ASCE 41-17 assessment procedures adapted for the non-seismic loading conditions associated with shielded enclosure dead loads and equipment live loads.


**Table 1: Illustrative Parameter Set For Modelled Retrofit Cases (Values Are Modelled, Not Measured)**

| Project ID | Structure Type | Age (yr) | Area (sq ft) | Shield Type | Cost (\$/ft <sup>2</sup> ) | Certification |
|------------|----------------|----------|--------------|-------------|----------------------------|---------------|
| P-01       | RC Bunker      | 62       | 4,200        | Welded      | 187                        | Pass          |
| P-02       | Steel Frame    | 45       | 8,500        | Modular     | 163                        | Pass          |
| P-03       | RC Admin       | 58       | 6,100        | Welded      | 195                        | Pass          |
| P-04       | Masonry        | 71       | 3,800        | Hybrid      | 212                        | Cond. Pass    |
| P-05       | Steel Frame    | 38       | 12,400       | Modular     | 148                        | Pass          |
| P-06       | RC Bunker      | 78       | 2,900        | Welded      | 231                        | Pass          |
| P-07       | Pre-Eng Metal  | 42       | 9,200        | Modular     | 176                        | Pass          |

## 4. ENGINEERING CONSTRAINTS AND ANALYSIS

### 4.1. Core Drilling and Penetration Management

Core drilling in legacy military structures presents challenges distinct from those encountered in contemporary construction. Reinforced concrete elements in Cold War-era structures frequently contain high-density rebar configurations (often #8 bars at 6-inch spacing or tighter in blast-resistant construction) with minimal cover, requiring ground-penetrating radar (GPR) survey prior to any drilling operation. The modelled cases assume approximately 20 to 25 penetrations per SCIF for mechanical, electrical, and communications routing, with penetration diameters ranging from 1.5 inches (communications conduits) to 18 inches (HVAC supply ducts).



**Fig 1 - Penetration Types in Legacy Structures**

Diamond-tipped core drill bits operating at controlled feed rates (typically 0.5–1.2 in/min for reinforced concrete) are recommended to minimize vibration-induced microcracking in surrounding

concrete. Wet drilling should be treated as mandatory to control dust containing potential asbestos fibers from legacy insulation materials and to maintain bit temperature below the threshold for thermal damage to surrounding rebar bond zones.

Fig. 1 illustrates the assumed distribution of penetration types across the modelled cases. HVAC ductwork constitutes the largest category, reflecting the substantial environmental conditioning requirements of SCIF spaces and the challenge of routing supply and return air through shielded boundaries. Each penetration represents a potential compromise to both the RF shielding envelope and the acoustic barrier, necessitating engineered sealing solutions specific to the penetration type and size.

## 4.2. Penetration Sealing and Waveguide Implementation

Every penetration through the SCIF shielded boundary must be sealed to maintain electromagnetic integrity. For metallic penetrations (conduit, pipe), circumferential welding or conductive gasket compression fittings provide direct metallic bond to the shield surface. Non-metallic penetrations require waveguide-below-cutoff (WBC) treatment, wherein a metallic tube of sufficient length-to-diameter ratio is installed to attenuate electromagnetic energy below the propagation threshold for the tube geometry [5].

The cutoff frequency for the dominant  $TE_{11}$  mode in a circular waveguide is given by:

$$f_{_c} = 1.841c / (2\pi a)$$

Where  $c$  is the speed of light and  $a$  is the waveguide radius. For frequencies below cutoff, the attenuation per unit length increases monotonically, providing the physical basis for WBC penetration treatment [5]. Below-cutoff attenuation scales with the length-to-diameter ratio of the tube, and a ratio of at least 3:1 is a common design starting point in commercial shielded-enclosure practice. It is not a universal requirement. Programme-specific criteria govern: HEMP applications under MIL-STD-188-125-1, for example, impose their own cutoff-frequency and length criteria that are more stringent than general commercial practice. In legacy structures where wall thickness is insufficient to achieve the required ratio, external waveguide extensions welded to the shield surface are employed.


**Table 2: Penetration Sealing Methods: Indicative Performance and Cost Parameters (modelled values drawn from manufacturer specifications and published cost data)**

| Penetration Type   | Sealing Method         | Attenuation (dB) | Cost/Unit (\$) | Install Time (hr) |
|--------------------|------------------------|------------------|----------------|-------------------|
| HVAC Duct (12")    | Honeycomb WBC          | >100             | 2,400          | 6                 |
| Elec. Conduit (2") | Circumferential Weld   | >120             | 180            | 1.5               |
| Plumbing (4")      | WBC + Gasket           | >100             | 850            | 3                 |
| Fiber Optic        | WBC (0.75" dia)        | >110             | 320            | 1                 |
| Fire Suppression   | Welded Fitting         | >100             | 1,100          | 4                 |
| Emergency Egress   | Shielded Door Assembly | >80              | 18,500         | 16                |

### 4.3. Structural Retrofitting for Shielded Enclosures

Modular shielded enclosures impose significant dead loads on existing floor systems. A typical welded-steel shielded room with 1/4-inch steel plate walls, ceiling, and floor generates dead loads of 30–45 psf on the supporting structure, exclusive of equipment loads. When combined with SCIF operational equipment loads (servers, workstations, storage systems) reaching 50–80 psf, the total demand can exceed 100 psf—well above the 40–60 psf live load capacity typical of legacy military administrative buildings designed to mid-20th century standards [7].

The reinforcement strategies available for the modelled cases comprise carbon fiber reinforced polymer (CFRP) strengthening of concrete beams and slabs, designed in accordance with ACI 440.2R [13]; steel beam supplementation beneath existing floor systems; micropile foundation augmentation; and full structural bay replacement. Selection among these is governed by the magnitude of the capacity deficit, access constraints, and the requirement to minimize construction duration within active military installations. Assessment of the existing structure prior to selection should follow the assessment and rehabilitation provisions of ACI 562 [10].




**Fig 2 - Load Capacity vs. Structure Age**

Fig. 2 presents the modelled relationship between structure age and residual load capacity, based on published degradation rates for the mechanisms discussed in Section II-B. Under these assumptions, structures exceeding 60 years in age fall below the 65% residual capacity threshold necessary for direct SCIF equipment loading without structural augmentation. This supports a recommendation that any structure older than approximately 55 years undergo comprehensive in-situ load testing rather than analytical assessment alone, prior to SCIF design development. The specific age threshold is a function of the assumed degradation rate and should be calibrated against local conditions.

## 5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### 5.1. RF Shielding Performance

Published measurements and finite-element analyses of reinforced concrete indicate that intrinsic attenuation is governed principally by rebar spacing and diameter rather than by the concrete itself, and that attenuation rises with frequency across the bands of interest [8]. The values adopted in the present model—on the order of 12 dB at 100 MHz rising to approximately 45 dB at 18 GHz for typical unshielded legacy construction—are consistent with that literature for the rebar configurations characteristic of Cold War-era construction. These values fall well below the facility-specific criteria that a CTTA would ordinarily establish for a SCIF. The modelled results indicate that both welded-steel and modular panel systems can close this gap, with welded-steel enclosures outperforming modular panel systems by approximately 8–15 dB across the modelled bandwidth, consistent with the seam and joint continuity difference between the two construction types [11].




**Fig 3 - RF Shielding Effectiveness**

Fig. 3 presents the modelled shielding effectiveness improvement attributable to retrofit shielding installation. The baseline curve reflects the inherent attenuation provided by 12-inch reinforced concrete walls typical of Cold War-era command facilities. The retrofit curve represents modelled performance following installation of a welded-steel shielded enclosure with honeycomb waveguide ventilation panels. The framework recommends designing to at least 10 dB of margin above the facility-specific acceptance criterion established by the CTTA, in order to accommodate degradation over the facility lifecycle. Because that criterion is determined per facility and is not publicly specified, the figure reports absolute attenuation rather than compliance margin.

### 5.2. Cost-Benefit Analysis

The lifecycle cost model follows the measurement conventions of ASTM E917 for life-cycle costing of buildings and building systems [14]. Under the assumptions set out in Table I and amortized over a 30-year facility service life, adaptive reuse yields total lifecycle cost savings in the range of 18–27% relative to equivalent new construction. The principal cost advantages derive from avoided site work and foundation construction, taken here as 15–25% of new construction cost, from existing building envelope utilization, and from accelerated occupancy. These are partially offset by hazardous materials abatement, structural supplementation, and penetration management. The model is most

sensitive to the assumed abatement cost and to the residual structural capacity of the host building; a sensitivity analysis across these two parameters is presented in Fig. 3. Where abatement is pervasive and residual capacity falls below 55%, the modelled saving narrows to below 5% and may reverse.




**Fig 4 - Cost Comparison per Subsystem**

Fig. 4 compares modelled per-square-foot costs by subsystem between new construction and adaptive reuse. Structural retrofit costs are lower in reuse scenarios owing to the existing structural frame, while HVAC upgrade costs are higher, reflecting the complexity of integrating modern environmental systems with existing building infrastructure and of routing ductwork through shielded boundaries in configurations constrained by legacy building geometry.

### 5.3. Project Execution and Timeline


Fig. 5 presents an indicative project timeline for a legacy structure SCIF retrofit. In the modelled sequence the critical path runs through the RF shield installation and penetration sealing phases, which together account for an estimated 50–60% of the total construction schedule. Certification testing conducted in accordance with IEEE Std 299 methodology should be allowed a minimum of three weeks for a typical SCIF, with provision for repeated testing cycles where initial measurements identify deficiencies at specific penetrations or shield panel joints.



**Fig 5: Typical Retrofit Project Timeline**

## 6. PROPOSED PROCESS FRAMEWORK

Drawing together the constraint domains examined above, this paper proposes a standardized process framework for legacy military structure SCIF conversion. The framework, illustrated in Fig. 6, sequences the major engineering activities to optimize schedule efficiency while maintaining compliance verification at each phase transition.



**Fig 6 - SCIF Retrofit Process Flow**

The framework emphasizes front-loaded assessment activities including comprehensive structural evaluation, electromagnetic site survey, and hazardous materials identification to reduce uncertainty and change-order risk during construction phases. The sequential nature of certain activities (e.g., hazmat abatement must precede core drilling) constrains schedule optimization opportunities, reinforcing the importance of thorough pre-construction planning.

**Table 3: Proposed Decision Matrix for Legacy Structure SCIF Feasibility Screening**

| Criterion                 | Favorable | Marginal  | Unfavorable |
|---------------------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|
| Residual Load Capacity    | >75%      | 55–75%    | <55%        |
| Wall Thickness (concrete) | >10 in    | 6–10 in   | <6 in       |
| Hazmat Presence           | None      | Localized | Pervasive   |
| Existing Penetrations     | <15       | 15–30     | >30         |
| Floor-to-Ceiling Height   | >12 ft    | 10–12 ft  | <10 ft      |
| Structure Age             | <40 yr    | 40–60 yr  | >60 yr      |

## 7. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has developed an engineering framework for evaluating the adaptive reuse of legacy military structures as SCIF-compliant facilities, and has exercised that framework across a modelled

scenario set. Subject to the modelling assumptions stated in Section III, the principal conclusions are as follows:

- Legacy reinforced concrete and steel-frame military structures contribute meaningful inherent RF attenuation, modelled here at 12–45 dB over 100 MHz to 18 GHz. This reduces the performance burden on installed shielding systems and, in the cost model, lowers shielding cost by an estimated 8–15% relative to new construction in lightweight building types.
- Core drilling in legacy structures requires GPR-guided planning, diamond-bit wet drilling at controlled feed rates, and post-drilling structural assessment to ensure that penetration routing does not compromise structural element capacity below required thresholds.
- Penetration sealing using waveguide-below-cutoff techniques, circumferential welding, and honeycomb vent panels is capable of attenuation in excess of 100 dB when correctly specified, installed, and verified. Manufacturer performance data should be confirmed by acceptance testing on each installation, since achieved performance is dominated by installation workmanship at seams and terminations.
- Under the cost model presented, adaptive reuse yields lifecycle cost savings of 18–27% relative to equivalent new construction, with the primary savings derived from existing foundation and superstructure utilization. This range is sensitive to abatement scope and residual structural capacity and should be re-derived with project-specific inputs rather than adopted as a general figure.
- Structures older than approximately 55 years warrant comprehensive in-situ structural load testing, rather than analytical assessment alone, prior to SCIF design development, in order to characterize residual capacity with acceptable confidence.

The principal limitation of this work is that it is analytical. The scenario set is constructed rather than observed, and the cost and attenuation values are modelled parameters drawn from published sources and standard engineering assumptions rather than from measurements at accredited facilities. The framework has not been validated against a documented portfolio of completed retrofits, and the quantitative ranges reported should be treated as indicative outputs of the stated model rather than as empirical findings. Access to facility-level SCIF performance and cost data is generally restricted, which is itself a structural obstacle to empirical work in this area; any such validation would require appropriate release authorization. Future work should therefore prioritise empirical validation against a documented project set, and should further address long-term electromagnetic shielding degradation in legacy structures, the impact of thermal cycling and moisture infiltration on shield joint integrity, and the development of non-destructive evaluation techniques for in-situ assessment of shield performance without facility downtime.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This paper draws exclusively on publicly available standards, published engineering literature, and open construction cost data. It uses no non-public project data and no agency-supplied records. The views expressed are those of the authors alone and do not represent the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

---

## REFERENCES

- [1] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Intelligence Community Standard 705-02: Standards for the Accreditation and Reciprocal Use of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities," Washington, DC, 22 Dec. 2016.
- [2] Department of Defense, "UFC 4-010-05: SCIF/SAPF Planning, Design, and Construction," Washington, DC, 26 May 2023.
- [3] Committee on National Security Systems, "CNSSAM TEMPEST/1-13: RED/BLACK Installation Guidance," Fort Meade, MD, 17 Jan. 2014.
- [4] American Concrete Institute, "ACI 364.1R-19: Guide for Assessment of Concrete Structures before Rehabilitation," Farmington Hills, MI, 2019.
- [5] D. M. Pozar, Microwave Engineering, 4th ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2012, pp. 112–148.
- [6] IEEE Standard Method for Measuring the Effectiveness of Electromagnetic Shielding Enclosures, IEEE Std 299-2006, 2006.
- [7] American Society of Civil Engineers, "ASCE 41-17: Seismic Evaluation and Retrofit of Existing Buildings," Reston, VA, 2017.
- [8] S.-Y. Hyun et al., "Analysis of shielding effectiveness of reinforced concrete against high-altitude electromagnetic pulse," IEEE Trans. Electromagn. Compat., vol. 56, no. 6, pp. 1488–1496, Dec. 2014, doi: 10.1109/TEM.2014.2322911.
- [9] National Institute of Building Sciences, "Whole Building Design Guide: Secure/Safe Criteria," Washington, DC, 2022.
- [10] American Concrete Institute, "ACI 562-19: Code Requirements for Assessment, Repair, and Rehabilitation of Existing Concrete Structures and Commentary," Farmington Hills, MI, 2019.
- [11] S. Celozzi, R. Araneo, and G. Lovat, Electromagnetic Shielding. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008.
- [12] Department of Defense, "UFC 3-340-02: Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions," Washington, DC, 2014.
- [13] American Concrete Institute, "ACI 440.2R-17: Guide for the Design and Construction of Externally Bonded FRP Systems for Strengthening Concrete Structures," Farmington Hills, MI, 2017.
- [14] ASTM International, "ASTM E917-17: Standard Practice for Measuring Life-Cycle Costs of Buildings and Building Systems," West Conshohocken, PA, 2017.
- [15] Department of Defense, "UFC 4-010-01: DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings," Washington, DC, 2018.