The Role of Quantum-Safe Cryptography in Next-Generation Security

  • Authors

    • Noah Wright Data Engineering Lead, SAP, Germany. Author
    • Isabella Moore HR Director, Siemens, Germany. Author

    DOI:

    https://doi.org/10.67228/30715628/IJMIET-2023PI9C2Q

    Published 05-03-2023

  • Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), Quantum-Safe Security, Lattice-Based Cryptography, NIST PQC, Shor’s Algorithm, Next-Generation Security, Hybrid Cryptography, Cybersecurity, Quantum Computing Threats

    Issue

    Section

    Articles

    How to Cite

    [1]
    N. Wright and I. Moore, “The Role of Quantum-Safe Cryptography in Next-Generation Security”, ijmiet, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 01–11, May 2023, doi: 10.67228/30715628/IJMIET-2023PI9C2Q.
  • Abstract

    Quantum computing offers major computational advances but threatens modern public-key cryptography. Classical algorithms such as RSA, Diffie–Hellman (DH), and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) are vulnerable to quantum attacks, particularly Shor’s algorithm. As large-scale quantum capabilities emerge, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has become essential to ensure future data confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. This paper discusses the need to replace classical cryptography, explores quantum-safe solutions, and examines challenges in large-scale migration. PQC is critical across government, critical infrastructure, finance, healthcare, telecommunications, IoT, autonomous vehicles, and 6G networks. A key concern is “harvest-now, decrypt-later” attacks, where encrypted data is stored today for future quantum decryption. The study analyzes classical cryptographic vulnerabilities and reviews major PQC families: lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, multivariate-based, and isogeny-based schemes, highlighting the ongoing NIST standardization efforts. It proposes a migration framework including quantum-readiness assessment, algorithm selection, hybrid implementation, and performance evaluation. Results show that although PQC introduces higher computational complexity, optimized implementations can support real-time applications with reasonable overhead. Among PQC approaches, lattice-based schemes appear most mature and balanced in terms of security and key size. The paper concludes that quantum-safe cryptography is a necessary evolution requiring continuous monitoring, adaptable systems, and alignment with emerging standards.

  • References

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    [12] Bos, J., Ducas, L., Lepoint, T., & Stevens, M. (2016). CRYSTALS–Kyber: A CCA-secure module-lattice-based KEM. NIST PQC Submission.

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